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DIAMONDS ON THE SOULS OF HER SHOES:
THE KIMBERLY PROCESS AND THE MORALITY
EXCEPTION TO WTO RESTRICTIONS
Karen E. Woody'
INTRODUCTION
Al-haji Sawaneh, a child living in Sierra Leone, was kidnapped and
conscripted into a rebel group.2 Shortly thereafter, he became a member of the
Small Boys Unit ("S.B.U.") of the rebel group, participating in a number of horrific
crimes against civilians and Sierra Leone's government soldiers. Sawaneh was one
of thousands of child soldiers in Sierra Leone who played a major role in a bloody,
decade-long civil war that claimed over 75,000 lives.' By the age of twelve,
Sawaneh skillfully wielded an AK-47, issued to him because it was lightweight and
more manageable for a small boy.4 The BBC reports that "(w)ithout the power of
the gun, the guerrillas, and their child recruits, would simply not have been able to
terrorize the country in the way they did."5 Even more alarming to the international
community, however, is that Sawaneh would not have received the AK-47 had it
not been for the exchange of Sierra Leonean diamonds for guns and ammunition.
Now, five years after the Sierra Leone ceasefire agreement, it is an uncontested
fact that conflict diamonds' fueled, and continue to fuel, many of Africa's wars.7
This fact has set the framework for numerous reports by various, non-governmental
1. Adjunct Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law; Litigation
Associate, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP; JD, American University, Washington College
of Law; BA, University of Virginia. I wish to thank Billie Jo Kaufman and the library staff at WCL for
helping me submit this article, as well as Amy Dillard and my family for their encouragement and
support.
2. Global Crime Report: The Child Soldiers of Sierra Leone, BBC NEWS, available at




6. "Conflict diamon,V' are defined as "diamonds which originate from areas in Africa
controlled by forces fighting the legitimate and internationally recognized government of the relevant
country." Global Witness, Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification, and
Control of Diamonds I (May 10, 2000), available at
http://globalwitness.org/reports/index.php?section=diamonds.
7. See Juliette Bennett, Public Private Partnerships: The Role of the Private Sector in
Preventing Funding Conflict, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 711, 713 (2002); see generally Laura Forest,
Sierra Leone and Conflict Diamonds: Establishing a Legal Diamond Trade and Ending Rebel Control
over the Country's Diamond Resources, 11 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 633 (2001) (reporting on the
significant ties between diamonds and human rights violations in Sierra Leone); see generally Ralph
Hazleton, Diamonds: Forever or For Good?, PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA, Occasional Paper #3
(Mar. 2002), available at http://blooddiamond.pacweb.org/docs/diamonds_3e.pdf (providing statistics
on diamond-funded conflict in the DRC, Sierra Leone, Angola, Liberia and the Central African
Republic).
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organizations ("NGOs") lambasting the human rights violations linked to the
diamond trade.8 The United Nations ("U.N.") issued sanctions toward African
nations and their rebel groups who capitalize on revenue from these gems.'
Subsequently, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, a multi-national
diamond trade regulation system mandating certificates of origin, went into effect
in 2003.'0 The Kimberley Process is a direct result of strides made by the diamond
industry, NGOs, and various governments to restrict the trade of rough conflict
diamonds," and thereby cut off one avenue of funding to rebel groups terrorizing
Africa.2
Because the Kimberley Process restricts trade to members of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO"), it violates certain articles of the GATT treaty. In May
2003, however, the WTO granted a waiver on trade restrictions in order to prohibit
the exportation of rough diamonds to non-Participants in the Kimberley Process.
The waiver has been reviewed on an annual basis, and was set to expire on
December 31, 2006. In December 2006, the WTO extended the waiver for six
years.
This Article analyzes the events predicating the Kimberley Process and
examines the validity of the Kimberley Process in relation to international trade
obligations. Part I describes the background of conflict diamonds and their role in
African wars. The section outlines the need for regulation in the diamond industry
and examines how other attempted measures at curbing the illicit diamond trade
have fallen short. Part II details the Kimberley Process and its guidelines. This
section analyzes the relevant U.S. legislation passed in 2003, the Clean Diamond
Trade Act. Part II also suggests that because the Kimberley Process ("KP") is
predicated upon voluntary compliance, the KP in its current form will have little to
no impact on curbing trade in conflict diamonds because its parameters are not
legally binding. Part III analyzes whether, despite the current WTO waiver, the KP
is a violation of international trade law. This section discusses the use of morality
in international trade and proposes that any WTO challenge to the legislation will
not stand because the Kimberley Process warrants the general exception to GATT
in Article XX(a). 3 Therefore, this section argues that despite its renewal, the
waiver is not necessary to preserve the goals of GATT and international trade laws.
8. See, e.g., Global Witness, Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification,
Certification, and Control of Diamonds, supra note 6.
9. See infra Section I.B.
10. See World Diamond Council, Conflict Diamonds,
http://www.diamondfacts.org/conflict/index.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2007) (outlining the history of
the Kimberley Process and providing detailed reports on the numerous meetings of participants).
1I. NICOLAS COOK, DIAMONDs AND CONFLICT: BACKGROUND, POLICY, AND LEGISLATION,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT RL30751, at 18 (updated July 16, 2003), available at
http://www.royce.house.gov/UploadedFilesfRL3075I .pdf.
12. See Ian Smillie, The Kimberley Process: The Case For Proper Monitoring, PARTNERSHIP
AFRICA CANADA, Occasional Paper #5, 1 (Sept. 2002), available at
http://blooddiamond.pacweb.org/docs/KPMonitoring.pdf (noting that conflict diamonds are often used
for money laundering and tax evasion, and pose a threat to the stability of the diamond trade along with
the political stability in Africa).
13. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art.
XX(a) [hereinafter GATT].
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I. BACKGROUND ON CONFLICT DIAMONDS AND THE NEED FOR REGULATION
A. Conflict Diamonds and Africa's Wars
Diamonds have long been the source of funding for both terrorism and rebel
insurgencies in Africa, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC),
Sierra Leone, Angola, and Liberia. 4 Diamonds are small, extremely fungible, and
consist of a high value-to-weight ratio that does not devalue very easily. 5
Furthermore, diamonds are extremely hard to track and police.'" For these reasons,
diamonds are often used by insurgent groups to buy arms or obtain funds for their
rebel causes. 7 Even today, diamond revenues are currently funding militia groups
in the northern DRC, a country entangled in a war that directly involves six other
14. See The Secretary-General, Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo,
delivered to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/2001/1072 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter
Addendum] (documenting the major players involved in the multi-national wars occurring in all of these
areas and the relationship to natural resources. The U.N. reports that various countries capitalize on the
instability in the DRC and other areas in order to exploit the natural resources of the region.); see also
Conflict for Profit, OXFAM AMERICA, http://www.oxfamamerica.org/advocacy/art826.html (providing
statistics on the number of deaths in civil wars in Sierra Leone, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of
Congo, and noting the number of other African nations that are either involved in these wars or are
directly affected by them).
15. See generally Global Witness, Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification,
Certification, and Control of Diamonds, supra note 6 (describing various types and average size of
diamonds and noting the ease with which they can be smuggled).
16. Lucinda Saunders, Note, Rich and Rare are the Gems They War: Holding De Beers
Accountable for Trading Conflict Diamonds, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1402, 1413-14 (2001) (discussing
the ease with which diamonds can be smuggled, and noting that "tracing the origin of conflict diamonds
is further complicated by the smuggling culture in the diamond business"); see also Christian Dietrich,
Hard Currency: The Criminalized Diamond Economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its
Neighbours, PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA, Occasional Paper #4, 2-3 (June 2002), available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2002/pac-drc-17jun.pdf (stating "diamonds require little
investment, they are portable, and the trade is - or seems to be - virtually uncontrollable. Certainly,
much of the international diamond trade is based on the free movement of diamonds from thousands of
small mines to trading centres, a system that disregards national borders, supervision and taxation"); see
also Diane Marie Amann, Capital Punishment: Corporate Criminal Liability for Gross Violations of
Human Rights, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 327, 330 (2001) (noting that diamonds are
impossible to trace, in part because "no analysis reveals with certainty whether a diamond came from a
legal mine" or if it "was extracted by slave laborers in Sierra Leone"); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, TERRORIST FINANCING: U.S. AGENCIES SHOULD SYSTEMATICALLY ASSESS TERRORISTS' USE
OF ALTERNATIVE FINANCING MECHANISMS, 20 n. 35 (Nov. 2003) (quoting Congressional Research
Service that that "a pound of diamonds in 2002 was worth around $225,000, compared with a pound of
cash that was worth $45,000 and a pound of gold, which was worth $4,800").
17. See Ian Smillie, Motherhood, Apple Pie and False Teeth: Corporate Social Responsibility in
the Diamond Industry, PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA, Occasional Paper #10, 10 (2003), available at
http://blooddiamond.pacweb.org/docs/pac csr e.pdf (discussing the numerous reported incidents where
diamonds are the source or reason behind armed conflict in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic
of Congo, and Angola); see also Amman, supra note 16, at 330 (stating that in Sierra Leone, the rebels
exchanged diamonds for guns as well as various types of drugs in order to force child soldiers into
addiction and continued allegiance to the rebel group).
2007]
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT'L LA W
nations. 8 The DRC, with some of the richest deposits of natural resources in the
world, has been at war with itself and its neighbors for decades. 9 Though the roots
of these conflicts are complex, they are often centered around control of diamond
mines.
2
Likewise, similar conflicts have raged, and to some extent, continue to rage in
Sierra Leone and Angola.2' Sierra Leone produces a large proportion of high-
quality gem diamonds and has been home to a significant amount of diamond
mining and production since the 1930s.2 However, Sierra Leone has been plagued
with conflict since its independence in 1961, and most recently had been involved
in a civil war from 1991 until late 2001.3 The civil war began when the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), infamous for cutting off limbs of civilians,
invaded from Liberia. 4 This group kidnapped thousands of civilians, many of
whom were children, and forced them into guerilla and militia training.25
Throughout the civil war, the RUF was firmly entrenched in the eastern part of
Sierra Leone near the Guinean and Liberian borders, called the Kono District.
26
This area is particularly diamond-rich and, because of its proximity to the border,
allowed for the RUF to easily trade diamonds out of the country in exchange for
weapons." The RUF took control of these diamond-rich areas as a means of
18. See Addendum, supra note 14, M 56-100 (specifically listing allegations against Rwanda,
Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia, including participation in the war in the DRC to their own
material and financial gain).
19. See generally Addendum, supra note 14.
20. Id. at 44; see also Smillie, The Kimberley Process: The Case For Proper Monitoring,
supra note 12, at 7 (stating "Uganda and Rwanda - countries with no diamonds of their own, but with
troops operating in the diamond areas of the DRC - were declared as the source of $3.7 million in
Belgian diamond imports in 2001").
21. See generally Forest, supra note 7 (detailing the history of the Sierra Leonean conflict since
the country's independence, as well as the current problems existing in Sierra Leone); see also Global
Witness, Can Controls Work? A Review of the Angolan Diamond Control System (December 2001),
available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/gwago_26dec.pdf (outlining Angolan
diamond industry and the role it has played in the 30 year war in Angola).
22. Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie, & Ralph Hazleton, The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone,
Diamonds, and Human Security, PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA 4 (Jan. 2000) available at
http://www.pacweb.org/e/pdf/heart/*20of /20the%20matter/ 2Osummary.pdf.
23. Id. at 1-2.
24. Forest, supra note 7, at 633 & 637 n. 34. It is worth noting that the eventual leader of the
RUF, Foday Sankoh, aligned himself with Charles Taylor of Liberia. This fact serves to illustrate the
point that the rebel insurgencies, as well as the illegal diamond trade, in both Sierra Leone and Liberia
are closely connected. Id. at 637. See also Smillie, Gberie, & Hazleton, supra note 22, at 6 (noting
Liberia's interests and involvement in Sierra Leone, particularly during the civil war, and stating "[b]y
the end of the 1990s, Liberia had become a major centre for massive diamond-related criminal activity,
with connections to guns, drugs and money laundering throughout Africa and considerably further
afield. In return for weapons, [Liberia] provided the RUF with an outlet for diamonds, and has done the
same for other diamond producing countries, fueling war and providing a safe haven for organized
crime of all sorts.").
25. Forest, supra note 7, at 637; see also Thomas Dunfee & Timothy Fort, Corporate
Hypergoals, Sustainable Peace, and the Adapted Firm, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 563, 614 (2003)
(underlining the fact that the RUF uses "murder, enslavement, torture, and child labor as a means of
accomplishing its goals").
26. See Forest, supra note 7 at 640 (providing an historical outline to the maneuvers of the RUF
during the decade-long war).
27. Id.
[Vol. 22:335
THE KIMBERLYPROCESS AND THE MORALITY EXCEPTION
political leverage in seeking their demands during the war, and often traded
diamonds for arms in order to outfit its militias.28
Similarly, Angola is a country with vast natural resources and a high
concentration of top-quality diamonds, yet it recently endured a twenty-seven year
war.29 The war, claiming over one million casualties, began in 1975 and lasted
until a peace agreement was signed in April 2002.30 The war in Angola involved
the leading rebel group, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA), headed by Jonas Savimbi, and the Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola (MPLA).3' It was well-known that UNITA funded its war efforts by
selling diamonds mined in the territory it controlled, whereas MPLA funded its war
efforts by controlling the nation's oil reserves.32 A U.N. report noted:
First, UNITA's ongoing ability to sell rough diamonds for cash and to
exchange rough diamonds for weapons provide the means for it to sustain
its political and military activities. Second, diamonds have been and
continue to be an important component of UNITA's strategy for acquiring
friends and maintaining external support. Third, rough diamond caches
rather than cash or bank deposits constitute the primary and the preferred
means of stockpiling wealth for UNITA.33
Control and possession of diamonds by rebels and criminals results in
continued funding of illegal activity and conflict. Likewise, a direct effect of the
illegal diamond trade and mineral exploitation is that the producing countries,
overrun by rebel groups, lose millions in possible revenue for the country.3" This
28. See Tracy Michelle Price, The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations,
and the Universality Debate, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 11 (2003) (providing insight to the tactics
of the RUF and other rebel groups in Sierra Leone, and stating that the group would "hold mines
random in exchange for a more democratic system, while killing and mutilating the local villagers").
29. See Global Witness, A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the
Angolan Conflict 1-3 (1998) available at
http://www.globalwitness.org/media librarydetail.php/90/en/a.roughtrade (detailing the history of
Angola's war and noting that Angola had been in prior conflicts between 1961 and 1975, in which it
fought for independence from Portugal).
30. Price, supra note 28, at 9.
31. Id. at 8-9.
32. See id. at 9 (noting the role that Angola's history, particularly its colonization history, has
played in the recent uprisings and the country's overall instability. Price also describes the history of
conflict between the MPLA and UNITA and how both groups used the country's vast natural resources
to finance the war). See also Global Witness, A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments
in the Angolan Conflict, supra note 29, at 2 (noting a BBC report that "instead of going to pay for
reconstruction efforts after 23 years of civil war, the oil revenues are being used by the MPLA
government to fuel its side of the conflict with the rebel UNITA movement").
33. U.N. SCOR, Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993) Concerning the
Situation in Angola, Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against
UNITA, 77, U.N. Doc S/2000/203 (March 10, 2000) [hereinafter Angola Sanctions Report]. MPLA
won a U.N.-monitored free election in 1992, yet UNITA did not cease fighting until 2002, after the
death of Savimbi. See Price, supra note 28, at 8 (stating that the death of Jonas Savimbi paved the way
for a peace agreement between UNITA and the government of Angola).
34. See Lansana Gberie, West Africa: Rocks in a Hard Place: The Political Economy of
Diamonds and Regional Destabilization, PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA, Occasional Paper #9, (May
2007)
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type of exploitation only contributes to the vicious cycle of war and conflict." For
example, approximately $854 million a year is stolen from the potential GDP of the
DRC because diamonds are smuggled out of the country. 6 As a result, the DRC's
infrastructure is further damaged, and rendered less capable of dealing with both
domestic and international conflicts." Similar figures are available for Angola and
Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone, the diamond exportation is measured at around $1.5
million a year, despite a possible $70 million in commercial value;38 in Angola,
reports allege that between $1 million and $1.2 million worth of diamonds are
smuggled out of the country per day. 9
B. The U.N. Response
In the mid-1990's, the U.N. began to recognize the severe humanitarian crises
occurring in Africa, as well as the financial link between diamonds and rebel
funding. Subsequently, the Security Council voted to prohibit importation of
diamonds from war-torn countries that produced conflict diamonds.' Despite its
2003), available at http://www.pacweb.org/e/images/stories/documents/w-africa-e.pdf (providing case
studies of Liberia, Guinea, C6te d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Sierra Leone and reporting on speculated loss of
revenue for each country as a result of the illegal diamond trade). See also Forest, supra note 7, at 641
(noting the dramatic decrease in diamond revenue in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 1995, during
which time the civil war had begun).
35. See Forest, supra note 7, at 640 (noting "The RUF's continued control over Sierra Leone's
diamond mines threatens the country's democratically elected government by providing the rebels the
means with which to purchase more guns to enhance their military capability. The stronger the RUF's
military capability, the greater the threat that the group will keep Sierra Leone hostage, both
economically and politically, as it has throughout the almost decade-long civil war.").
36. 148 CONG. REC. E908 (daily ed. May 24, 2002) (Extension of Remarks of Rep. Tony P.
Hall) (listing conflict diamond statistics in a preliminary effort to lobby for legislation by the U.S.
Congress against these conflict diamonds). Likewise, in 2001, the Belgian diamond imports declared
that $3.7 million of imported diamonds were from Uganda and Rwanda, neighboring countries of the
DRC, but which do not have any diamond areas of their own. Smillie, The Kimberley Process: The
Case For Proper Monitoring, supra note 12, at 7-10 (analyzing the differences in stated exports and
imports in the diamond industry).
37. See generally U.N. SCOR, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo [hereinafter Final
Report of Panel of Experts] U.N. Doc S/2002/1146 (2002) (providing detailed observations of the
political and economic state of affairs in DRC).
38. Amanda Bryant Banat, Note, Solving the Problem of Conflict Diamonds In Sierra Leone:
Proposed Market Theories and International Legal Requirements for Certification of Origin, 19 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 939, 940-41 (2002) (relating these numbers to the amount of revenue that ended up in
the hands of Sierra Leone rebels).
39. Global Witness, Can Controls Work? A Review of the Angolan Diamond Control System,
supra note 21, at 1-2 (noting that "[t]he scale of this smuggling indicates that there continue to be major
problems surrounding the international trade in rough diamonds and that the U.N. imposed sanctions are
still not being fully enforced. It is an open secret in the diamond trade and elsewhere that uncertified
Angolan diamonds are being described as Zambian, South African, or are mixed into parcels originating
from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo Brazzaville.").
40. See G.A. Res. 55/56, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/56 (Jan. 29, 2001) (noting the recognition by the
international community of the problems and human rights violations linked with conflict diamonds in
Africa).
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efforts, U.N. policies and sanctions left numerous loopholes for rough diamonds to
get into the market without regulation."
In the case of the DRC, the U.N. intervened in an effort to establish peace
among rebels and neighboring countries."2 The U.N. Panel of Experts then issued a
report on the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources and alleged that
rebels and armies of neighboring countries were continuing the conflict in order to
gain access to diamond mines.43  The Panel strongly recommended that
Governments regulate and sanction those individuals and entities alleged to be
committing illegal activities in the DRC."
In Sierra Leone, the U.N. imposed sanctions in 1997 after years of fighting and
failed cease-fires.45 Reports indicate that the RUF remained capable of continually
acquiring guns and ammunition by trading diamonds even after these sanctions
were in place." The U.N. subsequently adopted Resolution 1306"' in July 2000,
which mandated a worldwide ban on the purchase of rough diamonds originating
from Sierra Leone."8 Eventually, the ongoing war in Sierra Leone and the
ineffectiveness of U.N. sanctions to bring about peace or curb the trade in conflict
diamonds pushed the issue of conflict diamonds into the public's eye, in part due to
numerous reports from NGOs and the U.N. itself49
In the case of Angola, the U.N. imposed an embargo on any sale of weapons or
petroleum to UNITA, with the first sanctions being introduced in 1993.10 In 1998,
the U.N. Security Council passed Resolutions 1173 and 1176, disallowing any
exportation of unofficial diamonds from the country."' However, a Global Witness
report noted:
41. See Price, supra note 28, at 61 (alleging that U.N. sanctions did not provide any significant
deterrence to the rampant illegal diamond trade in Sierra Leone, Angola, or the Democratic Republic of
Congo).
42. See id. at 16-19 (stating that countries including Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and Zimbabwe
are integral in the conflict in the DRC, calling the conflict "Africa's First World War," and noting that in
only four years over 2.5 million people have been killed).
43. The Secretary-General, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, $ 21-24, U.N.
Doc S/2002/1146 (Oct. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Final Report of Panel of Experts].
44. See id. 170 (detailing the numerous recommendations proffered by the U.N. in an attempt
to deal with illegal activity in the DRC).
45. See generally Banat, supra note 38, at 940-44 (describing history of conflict); see also
Forest, supra note 7, at 644-47 (describing Resolution 1306, a U.N. effort to ban the purchase of Sierra
Leonean diamonds whose origin is not officially certified by the Government of Sierra Leone and
calling for a well-regulated diamond industry within the country. Forest notes that although Resolution
1306 was heralded by the international community, its duration was set for eighteen months).
46. See generally, Global Crime Report: The Child Soldiers of Sierra Leone, supra note 2
(providing a case study regarding Sierra Leonean rebels and their high quantity of guns).
47. S.C. Res. 1306, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1306 (July 5, 2000).
48. Forest, supra note 7, at 644.
49. See Global Witness, Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification,
and Control of Diamonds, supra note 6, at 1-2.
50. Angola Sanctions Report, supra note 33, I 1-3.
51. S.C. Res. 1173, 12, S/RES/1 173 (June 12, 1998); S.C. Res. 1176, S/RES/I 176 (June 24,
1998); see Global Witness, A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan
Conflict, supra note 29, at 3 (noting that some diamonds could still be exported from Angola so long as
they were accompanied by a certificate of origin issued by the government).
2007]
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Whilst resulting in some reduction of revenue for UNITA, the
implementation of UNSC Res. 1176 appears token at best. Investigations
reveal that significant diamond exports still take place, mainly by air and
in smaller quantities, through countries such as Zambia. Most of the
diamonds are sold on the open market in Antwerp and in other countries. 2
Thus, in the midst of U.N. sanctions, conflict diamonds were easily finding
their way to the market. For example, Belgian imports declared as originating in
the Central African Republic (CAR) have exceed the reported exports by a factor
of three over the past few years, with the exception of 2001 when they were double
the official exports. 3 Even after the U.N. imposed an embargo on diamonds, the
sales from CAR increased and there were more diamond bureaus. These numbers
and reports seem to indicate that the U.N. sanctions did not have a significant
impact on curbing the illicit diamond trade.
C. The Diamond Industry
In 1998, the diamond industry produced about 115 million carats of rough
diamonds, valued at about $6.7 billion. 4 This amount of rough diamonds became
67.1 million pieces of jewelry, valued around $50 billion.5 Estimates show that
conflict diamonds comprised between 3.7 and 15 percent of the world diamond
trade in recent years.5 6 Unsurprisingly, the United States is the world's biggest
diamond market, with 1,800 licensed diamond dealers in New York alone.1
7
De Beers ranks as the largest diamond company in the world, mining roughly 50
percent of the world's diamonds and controlling 70 to 80 percent of diamond
sales.5 Marketing and a positive industry image have played an important role in
the diamond industry's success and, in particular, the success of De Beers. 9
52. Global Witness, A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan
Conflict, supra note 29, at 3.
53. Christian Dietrich, Diamonds in the Central African Republic: Trading, Valuing, and
Laundering, PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA, Occasional Paper #8, 5 (Jan. 2003), available at
http://www.pacweb.org/e/images/stories/documents/care.pdf (detailing the role the Central African
Republic plays as a conduit for illegal diamonds, particularly in relation to the fact that "approximately
US$50-60 million worth of diamonds mined in rebel territory in eastern and northern DRC 'disappear'
into the global rough diamond pipeline every year").
54. Smillie, Gberie, & Hazleton, supra note 22, at 1.
55. Id. at 1
56. COOK, supra note 11, at 12 (reporting to Congress on the background of conflict diamonds,
the steps taking on an international scale to deter trade in conflict diamonds, and the current posture of
the Bush administration regarding recent conflict diamond legislation).
57. Global Witness, Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification, and
Control of Diamonds, supra note 6, at 5. See Ban "Conflict Diamonds, " Oxfam America, Ban
"Conflict" Diamonds, available at http://www.oxfamamerica.org/Plone/contents/art701.html (last
visited Apr. 17, 2007) (stating that the United States is the largest importer of diamonds in the world,
with Americans currently buying 65% of the world's market).
58. Saunders, supra note 16, at 1407-08 n.22 (illustrating the broad reach that De Beers holds
within the diamond industry and arguing that the company should be held liable for various human
rights violations related to conflict diamonds).
59. De Beers, the most lucrative diamond company in the world, is known for initiating one of
the most successful marketing campaigns of the 20th century when it introduced the "Diamonds Are
[Vol. 22:335
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However, due to reports by various NGOs on the diamond-fuelled wars in Sierra
Leone, the diamond industry began to worry about its product image.' It is worth
noting that prior to the press on conflict diamonds resulting from pressure by
international NGOs, the diamond industry had not taken any significant measures
to ensure against trade in conflict diamonds.6' The negative press forced the
diamond industry to act so that it could avoid losing millions from potential
consumer abandonment, as the fur industry had years earlier. 2
Consequently, in May 2000, the South African government held a meeting for
NGOs, diamond industry leaders, and governmental leaders to discuss the
ramifications of the conflict diamond trade, which led to the creation of the
Kimberley Process.63 Implementation of the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme occurred on January 1, 2003 after a series of meetings, including the
Interlaken Convention of November 2002, which marked the official certification
of the scheme.' Thirty-six countries and the European Community were present at
Forever" campaign. The success of this campaign underscores the importance of marketing and product
image in the diamond industry. De Beers at one point had a comer on the diamond market by
employing a strategy of "buying all of the diamonds on the market in an effort to control and stabilize
the price of diamonds," yet the company has since changed its policy. Id. at 1430-31. However,
commentators suggest that De Beers would often purchase diamonds from smugglers in order to
maintain control over the supply of diamonds. See id. at 1431 n.144 Another reason the diamond
industry has been successful yet highly unregulated is the nature of its transactions. "According to
industry experts and government officials, U.S. and international diamond firms do not share trade
information freely and business may be conducted on the basis of a handshake, with limited
documentation." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: CRITICAL ISSUES REMAIN
IN DETERRING CONFLICT DIAMOND TRADE, 12 (June 2002).
60. See Dunfee & Fort, supra note 25, at 610-15 (noting that the reports linking diamonds and
human rights violations prompted the World Diamond Council to take proactive steps to change the
public perception out of fear of the impact negative product or industry image could have upon the
industry).
61. In 1997, the CEO of De Beers made a statement at a press conference evincing a business
relationship between UNITA and De Beers. He noted, "One of the essential jobs that we De Beers [sic]
carry out worldwide is to ensure that diamonds coming onto the markets do not threaten the overall
price structure and therefore although we have no direct relationship with Unita, there is no doubt that
we buy many of those diamonds that emanate from Unita-held areas in Angola...." Global Witness,
Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification, and Control of Diamonds, supra
note 6, at 8. In light of increasing worldwide awareness of conflict diamonds, De Beers has since
claimed they have never purchased diamonds from UNITA. Id.
62. See Dunfee & Fort, supra note 25, at 615. Interestingly, the fur trade has significantly
declined in recent decades, ostensibly as a result of negative press related to the industry's cruelty
towards animals. For instance, in 1981, four million mink pelts were produced, as opposed to 2.5
million in 2001. The Humane Society of the United States attributes this drop in the industry to the
increasing consumer awareness about the inhumane treatment of animals in fur farming. Press Release,
The Humane Society of the United States, The HSUS Is Encouraged By Decline In Domestic Mink
Industry (Aug. 29, 2001), available at http://www.hsus.org/ace/11913.
63. See World Diamond Council, The Essential Guide to Implementing the Kimberley Process
11, available at http://www.jvclegal.org/kimberely.pdf (outlining the history of the Kimberley Process
and providing detailed reports on the numerous meetings of participants).
64. Id. at 1, 5. World Diamond Council, Interlaken Declaration of 5 November 2002 on the
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds (Nov. 5, 2002) available at
http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.comvUpdated%20dcuments%202003/lnteriaken%2Declaratin.sht
ml (providing the text to the document signed by all intending participants of the KP, including the
statement that the participants will "ensure that the measures taken to implement the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme for rough diamonds will be consistent with international trade rules").
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the Interlaken Convention. 5 The original list of participants was agreed upon in
July 2003, listing forty members." Participation in the scheme, however, is
contingent upon meeting certain qualifications discussed below.
II. THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS
A. Goals and Guidelines
The primary goal of the Kimberley Process is to restrict the flow of conflict
diamonds by requiring all rough diamonds to be accompanied by certificates of
origin. 7 The KP also seeks to protect the legitimate diamond industry as well as
contribute to international peace and security by keeping conflict diamonds out of
the hands of rebels and terrorists." Accordingly, each diamond-producing nation
must be able to account for its diamonds from the mines to the point of
exportation. 9 It is worth noting, however, that in its present form, the Kimberley
Process deals only with rough diamonds, because the source of the diamond is what
is at issue." In other words, the most pressing issue regarding conflict diamonds is
centered on the diamond mines rather than the later stages of diamond production
such as cutting, polishing and setting.7
65. World Diamond Council, Interlaken Declaration of 5 November 2002 on the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds, supra note 64.
66. See Press Release, Amnesty International, Kimberley Process Finally Agrees Membership
List But Lack of Monitoring Undermines Credibility (July 31, 2003), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/ndex/ENGPOL300112003 [hereinafter Lack of Monitoring Undermines
Credibility]. The original forty members included: Angola, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Botswana,
Canada, Central African Republic, People's Republic of China, Chinese Taipei, DRC, Republic of
Congo, Cote D'Ivoire, Croatia, the European Community, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, India, Israel,
Japan, Republic of Korea, People's Republic of Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Poland,
the Russian Federation, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tanzania,
Thailand, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, USA, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. World Diamond Council, The
Essential Guide to Implementing the Kimberley Process, supra note 63, at 1. The Kimberley Process
currently has forty-seven active members. Kimberley Process, List of Participants, available at
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/site/participants.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
67. World Diamond Council, A System for International Rough Diamond Export and Import
Controls (Oct. 17, 2000), available at http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.com/system.shtml.
68. Kimberley Process, Report of the Kimberley Process to the United National General
Assembly as per Resolution 55/56 of 1 December 2000, available at
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/www-docs/related-docsl/report-to-unga.pdf (illustrating
the many goals of the Kimberley Process and its hope to deter the humanitarian crises surrounding
conflict diamonds).
69. Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law,
96 Am. J. INT'L L. 461, 485 (2002) (noting that if the regulation does not track the entire course of the
diamond, from extraction to exportation, then regulation will have little to no legal effect).
70. See COOK, supra note 11, at 31.
71. Rough diamonds, as compared to those that have been cut and polished, are easier to trace.
"Although rough diamonds can be marked, once they are cut and polished, any form of identification is
erased." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: CRITICAL ISSUES REMAIN IN
DETERRING CONFLICT DIAMOND TRADE, supra note 59, at 8.
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Participants may only trade rough diamonds with countries that are also
participants in the KP.72 This is mandated by a political agreement between
participating countries as signatories of the KP. 3 The KP does not constitute a
binding international treaty; rather, it is more akin to an international political
agreement between nations, and thus, is largely self-enforced.7 ' Despite the fact
that the KP is not an official treaty, the U.N. has backed the KP initiative, and this
support serves to buttress the international legitimacy of the process.75
Specifically, participating countries set national policies mandating the
certification scheme, requiring that certificates of origin accompany all imported
and exported rough diamonds.76 Each certificate of origin must include a label
stating "Kimberley Process Certificate" and the statement: "The rough diamonds in
this shipment have been handled in accordance with the provisions of the
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for rough diamonds."77 Furthermore, any
shipment of diamonds must be tamper-resistant and include other specifics such as
the date of issuance and expiration, the identification of the exporter and importer,
the weight, the amount in US dollars.78
Participants also must set up a system of internal controls and regulations
aimed at prohibiting any shipment of rough diamonds into its borders.79 This is
essentially the monitoring arm of the KP. Participating countries are required to
pass domestic legislation, and consequently, any infraction of the KP would be
policed by domestic agents, as such a violation would be a violation of that
particular country's national law. Likewise, participants must designate an
"Importing and Exporting Authority (ies)," as well as a system of documentation of
imports and exports."0
72. Kimberley Process, Background, available at
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/site/background.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
73. See Price, supra note 28, at 37 (outlining the general guidelines laid out in the Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme).
74. Id. at 66.
75. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Expresses Strong Support For
'Kimberley Process', Aimed At Halting Illicit Diamond Trade Used To Fuel Conflicts, U.N. Doc.
SC/7648 (Jan. 28, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7648.doc.htm
(issuing press release detailing the U.N. backing to the recent strides made in implementing the
Kimberley Process) [hereinafter Security Council Press Release Supporting Kimberley Process].
Because the U.N. expressed its support in this document and in Resolution 55/56, the Kimberley Process
gained both international recognition and support. Furthermore, the U.N. endorsement renders the KP
less likely to be susceptible to a WTO challenge. See infra Section II.C. 1.
76. See Kimberley Process, Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 7, available at
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/site/content/KPCS.pdf.
77. Id. at 12. See also Kimberley Process, Background, supra note 72 (explaining why these
strict guidelines were adopted and why compliance with them is essential to the success of the KP).
78. Kimberley Process, Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, supra note 76, at 14-15. The
Kimberley Process outlined specific guidelines to ensure universal application of the scheme and to
provide regulations for domestic customs agencies.
79. See generally Smillie, The Kimberley Process: The Case For Proper Monitoring, supra note
12 (articulating the importance of stringent domestic regulation and enforcement in order to ensure any
success of the KP).
80. Id. at 14. The system of documentation for imports and exports is similar to that of a
national customs agency and ensures that goods both entering and leaving the country meet the relevant
standards, as outlined in domestic legislation.
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The KP's biggest flaw lies in the fact that, at present, there is no international
monitoring body and thus, no legally binding compliance standards."' The reality
of this is that the KP, while a step in the right direction towards slowing the illicit
diamond trade, does not have any international system of enforcement. The extent
of any monitoring lies within the realm of domestic enforcement for any violation
of domestic legislation. 2 However, this enforcement could be sporadic at best, and
entirely at the discretion of the participating country. As a result, it is unlikely that
the KP will be effective in producing participants' compliance due to the lack of
sanctioning measures and monitoring capabilities, unless the countries are
committed to monitoring with their domestic police power.83
Another problem related to a lack of substantial monitoring is that of
transshipment. 4 Transshipment occurs when conflict diamonds are transported
from one country to another but pass through at least one country before their final
destination point. There is a significant risk that upon entry into the transit country,
the diamonds could be stolen and subsequently re-exported with fraudulent claims
of origination from the transit country. This process would circumvent the KP and
its corresponding legislation. Moreover, this type of illegal transaction could occur
if the diamonds do not have any record of the chain of custody, and if transit
countries are not likely to closely monitor goods that are simply passing through
their borders. 5
81. This flaw has been harped on by various NGOs endorsing the Kimberley Process. See, e.g.,
Amnesty International, The True Cost of Diamonds - Kimberley Process, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/ec-diamonds-eng (last visited Apr. 17, 2007) (stating that Amnesty
International has continually warned of the possible failure of the scheme due to the possibility of
noncompliance, and imploring the participants to set up formal arrangements for effective monitoring).
See also Lack of Monitoring Undermines Credibility, supra note 66 (issuing a statement announcing its
recommendation for participating countries to allow for impartial reviews every two years; otherwise,
the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme risks ineffectiveness).
82. See Lack of Monitoring Undermines Credibility, supra note 66 (reporting on the progress of
Kimberley Process regulation and stating: "The 40 countries that did make the list only meet the
requirements on paper. The Participation Committee did not assess how laws and regulations are being
implemented and enforced. This underlines the urgent need for regular and impartial monitoring of in
[sic] the Kimberley Process to assess whether diamond control systems work effectively in practice.
Currently there are no formal arrangements for effective monitoring, and many governments are even
reluctant to discuss the subject.").
83. See generally Smillie, The Kimberley Process: The Case For Proper Monitoring, supra note
12.
84. See Price, supra note 28, at 65-66 (noting the possible loopholes to the KP due to its
structure of being a "system of national laws" and stating that flaws still exist in the current system).
85. See Smillie, The Kimberley Process: The Case For Proper Monitoring, supra note 12, at 5
(stating that three reasons governments have been reluctant to effectuate monitoring are high costs,
commercial confidentiality, and national sovereignty). For these same reasons, governments may be
reluctant to vigilantly monitor goods passing through their borders. Furthermore, it should be noted that
at present, the Kimberley Process involves a mere forty members. Thus, the illicit diamond trade may
remain alive and well among non-members without the threat of international sanctions to some extent.
Although the KP is not an actual treaty, it is similar in its effect. Timothy Glut aptly notes that treaties
may be the "strongest" form of international law because "they are written, binding agreements between
nations. A significant drawback to treaties, however, is that a particular treaty binds only those nations
party to it. Without custom for support, treaties are a poor source of international law among outside
parties." Timothy Glut, Note, Changing the Approach to Ending Child Labor: An International Solution
to an International Problem, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1203, 1212-13 (1995). Countries that are not
WTO members or KP Participants but who either produce or trade in diamonds are Armenia, Andorra,
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B. WTO Regulations and U.S. Legislation
The KP operates as a result of national legislation passed by each participant
that agrees to the certification scheme.16 Because of this, specific countries must
enact domestic legislation in compliance with the KP in order to meet the
requirements of participation. 7 Twenty-four countries were on the original, but not
final, list of participants;" these countries were excluded from the final list because
they did not pass the corresponding domestic legislation to the KP. 9
Because the KP deals directly with international trade regulations, it must comport
with WTO guidelines. The WTO is an international institution that oversees
international trade disputes and procedures. The relevant treaty to the KP is the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)." GATT was signed by twenty-
three contracting parties in 1947, a few years after the termination of World War
I1.1' After numerous rounds of negotiations, the contracting parties to GATT
created the WTO Agreement, which became effective in 1995.1' The creation of
WTO expanded upon the GATT treaty and established mechanisms for
international dispute settlement related to trade. The thrust of GATT is the
promotion of fair international trade. Thus, under Article XI of GATT, members of
WTO are not allowed to restrict trade to other members.93
The initial hesitation of many countries, including the United States, to
becoming a participant in the KP was a concern that there existed possible WTO
challenges to the structure of the KP.94 A challenge to the KP could be warranted
because, in its current state, the KP violates Article XI of the GATT treaty, which
holds that no member may make quantitative restrictions to international trade with
Bermuda, Belarus, British Virgin Islands, Iran, Lebanon, Monaco, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and Ukraine.
Price, supra note 28, at 5 n. 27.
86. See World Diamond Council, The Essential Guide to Implementing the Kimberley Process,
supra note 63 (detailing the requirements for participation in the KPCS).
87. See Kimberley Process, Background, supra note 72.
88. Lack of Monitoring Undermines Credibility, supra note 66.
89. Id. See also BS Commodities Bureau, WTO Waiver for Kimberly [sic] Norm on Diamond
Trade (March 5, 2003), available at http://www.rediff.com/money/2003/mar/05wto.htm [hereinafter BS
Commodities Bureau] (noting that Brazil and the Philippines were granted a WTO waiver yet are not
presently participants in the certification scheme).
90. GATT, supra note 13.
91. Christoph T. Feddersen, Focusing on Substantive Law in International Economic Relations:
The Public Morals of GATT's Article XX(a) and "'Conventional" Rules of Interpretation, 7 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE, 75, 79 (1998). After the passage of GATT, the US and Great Britain proposed an
International Trade Organization to regulate international economic affairs, and increase world trade.
However, this proposed charter failed to pass in Congress, so GATT remained the "primary mechanism
for coordinating global trade policy for the next half-century." Id.at 80-81.
92. Id.
93. See GATT, supra note 13, art. XI.
94. See Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion or Superiority Complex?: What to Make of the WTO
Waiver for "Conflict Diamonds," 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1177, 1181 (2003) (noting that some WTO
members feared the KP was inconsistent with WTO rules). See also Ted L. McDorman, The GATT
Consistency of U.S. Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishing and Save Whales, Dolphins and
Turtles, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON 477 (1991) (outlining the requirements for meeting GATT
guidelines for international trade and noting the cases where the GATT general exceptions have been
applied).
2007]
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INTL LAW
other members.95 At the KP's inception, thirty-seven diamond-producing countries
were members of the WTO but were not participants in the KP.' As a result,
American policy-makers hesitated to sign the agreement out of fear that
involvement in the KP risked a WTO challenge because it prohibited any trade in
diamonds with these other WTO members.97 The WTO subsequently provided a
waiver for eleven countries, including the United States to any possible Article XI
infraction in February 2003 . 8  However, the waiver stipulates that all WTO
members retain the right to bring concerns of inconsistent application of the KP, as
related to potential benefits to certain WTO members at the expense of other
members.99 The waiver is analyzed by members of the WTO each year, and was
recently renewed until December 2012.11
As a direct result of the WTO waiver, the United States passed the Clean
Diamond Trade Act, which became Public Law on April 25, 2003.11 The law
allows for the President to implement regulations consistent with the KP.102 As
noted above, the legislation specified that its reach extended only to rough
diamonds."°3 This is significant because the U.S. imports the highest amount of
diamonds a year, rough or polished, amounting to about $597.38 million in 2001,
and nearly $10.06 billion in polished diamonds that have not yet been mounted or
95. GATT, supra note 13, art. XI.
96. Price, supra note 28, at 5 n.27 (listing the countries that had not signed on to the Kimberley
Process but were current members of the WTO, including Austria, Barbados, Congo, Cyprus, Denmark,
Egypt, Finland, The Gambia, Greece, Guyana, Hong Kong, Hungary, Ireland, Indonesia, Kenya,
Kuwait, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Netherlands,
Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay,
United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela).
97. GATT, supra note 13. See Price, supra note 28,at 48-51 (noting that although some
countries still hold that the WTO waiver of the requirements of GATT Article XI was unnecessary, the
United States refused to be a participant without the waiver; this refusal stemmed from WTO
restrictions against any discrimination between goods on a non-product related basis). However, many
participants held that Article XX and Article XXI of GATT protected the KP from WTO challenge
because the intention of the KP was enforcing human and national security.
98. Council for Trade in Goods, Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for
Rough Diamonds, G/C/W/432/Rev.1 (Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Waiver Concerning KP]. See also BS
Commodities Bureau, supra note 89 (noting that the waiver extends from January 1, 2003 until
December 31, 2006). The eleven countries that were granted this exemption are: Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Israel, Japan, Korea, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and the United
States.
99. Waiver Concerning KP, supra note 98.
100. See Council for Trade in Goods, Extension of Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme For Rough Diamonds, G/C/W/559Rev.1 (Nov. 17, 2006), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/G/C/W559R1 .doc.
101. Clean Diamond Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 108-19, 117 STAT. 631 (2003) (specifying what
diamond import and export controls will be put into American trade law, in compliance with Kimberley
Process guidelines). The legislation was introduced as H.R. 1584.
102. Id. § 5(a), 117 STAT. at 634. Statement on Signing the Clean Diamond Trade Act, 1 PUB.
PAPERs 386 (April 25, 2003). This legislation marks over a decade's worth of policy geared toward the
issue of conflict diamonds. The Clinton Administration held numerous conferences to discuss conflict-
ridden, diamond-producing countries. Likewise, the Clinton Administration sought international
sanctions to prevent the trade in conflict diamonds, and tried to assist Angola and Sierra Leone to
improve their diamond export certification systems. COOK, supra note 11, at 23-30 (detailing the steps
the current and previous administrations have taken regarding conflict diamonds and corresponding
legislation).
103. COOK, supra note 11, at 30-31.
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set in jewelry.'" Critics of the bill initially asserted that there are many loopholes
inherent in regulating only rough diamonds.'05 For instance, rough diamonds can
easily be disguised as jewelry by merely putting them in some sort of setting, and
thereby circumventing any federal regulation.'" Nonetheless, the bill passed with
an overwhelming majority and is regarded as a positive step in a fight against the
illegal diamond trade.
III. DIAMOND LEGISLATION: IMMUNE FROM A WTO CHALLENGE
A. General Exceptions: Articles XX and XXI
As noted above, the United States refused to pass domestic legislation related
to the KP without the safeguard of the WTO waiver.'7 However, the WTO draft
waiver, allowing eleven countries to pass legislation that would be consistent with
international trade law, specified certain caveats, including that any member may
bring an issue before the General Council if the member considers that measures
regulating the import or export of rough diamonds covered by this waiver are being
applied inconsistently.'0 Furthermore, the waiver was enacted for a set duration of
time, and was set to expire December 31, 2 006"m but was renewed until December
2012.0' Because the waiver itself does not negate all possible challenges to the
Kimberley Process,"' one must examine whether, despite the waiver, the KP can be
considered legitimate in the eyes of international law. An examination of the
GATT treaty and its exceptions is necessary in order to determine if the KP
comports with international trade law.
The GATT Treaty prohibits blocking trade of goods with other members of
WTO, yet retains certain exceptions to this prohibition."2 These exceptions are
found in Articles XX and XXI. Article XX of the GATT treaty allows for
members of the WTO to adopt measures restricting trade if these measures are "not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail ... .




107. See infra Section II.B.
108. Waiver Concerning KP, supra note 98. The waiver states that any member may bring an
issue before the General Council if the member "considers that measures regulating the import or export
of rough diamonds covered by this waiver are being applied inconsistently with this waiver or that any
benefit accruing to it under the GA T' 1994 may be or is being impaired unduly as a result of measures
to implement the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme covered by this waiver and that considers that
consultations have proved unsatisfactory." Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. See Council for Trade in Goods, Extension of Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme For Rough Diamonds, supra note 100.
111. Waiver Concerning KP, supra note 98.
112. GATT, supra note 13, art. XI.
113. Id. art. XX (noting general exceptions to the treaty).
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Likewise, in order to warrant the exception provided in Article XX, the restricting
measures must be deemed, "a) necessary to protect public morals; b) necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health .... 114 Likewise, Article XXI
stipulates that any trade restriction invoked for the purpose of national security or
taken in pursuit of any obligations under the U.N. Charter will qualify for an
exception."5
International trade disputes are settled within WTO by way of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(Dispute Settlement Understanding, hereinafter "DSU")."6 A contracting party to
GATT is able to bring a dispute under Article XXIII by stating that any benefits
"accruing to it under GATT had been 'nullified or impaired' as a result of another
contracting party's restrictive measures.I" The exceptions listed in Article XX are
the only provisions that justify any violation of GATT and therefore grant
immunity to any challenge made by a contracting party. A two-fold analysis is
used to determine if an exception under Article XX will stand legally. First, the
regulation must be in compliance with the exception, meaning that the regulation
must be necessary to protect public morals and public health, among other things."8
Second, the regulation must comply with the chapeau, or introductory clause, of
Article XX."9 Compliance with the chapeau simply entails that contracting parties
must "refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty."'20
Article XX(b) is often invoked as an exception to GATT obligations. 2' This
article allows for restrictive trade measures for the sake of protecting public health
or animal welfare. Notable cases dealing with Article XX(b) include the Tuna-
Dolphin cases,'2 the Shrimp-Turtle case,'23 and disputes concerning animal leg
114. Id.
115. See GATT, supra note 13, art. XXI (stating a general exception for national security issues or
restrictive measures taken in compliance with the U.N. charter).
116. Feddersen, supra note 91, at 81-82.
117. Id. at 82-83.
118. GATT Article XX grants exceptions for measures related to the following: the protection of
public morals; the protection of human, animal or plant life or health; the importation or exportation of
gold or silver; compliance with laws and regulations including customs and monopolies enforcement,
protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights, and prevention of deceptive practices; products of
prison labor; the protection of natural resources; exports of domestic materials necessary to ensure
essential quantities of materials for domestic processing industries when the domestic price of materials
is held below the world price; the distribution of products in general or local short supply. GATT, supra
note 13, art. XX.
119. See GATT, supra note 13, art. XX (stating that all measures must be "subject to the
requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade .... ").
120. Price, supra note 28, at 54.
121. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/ABIR, (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report].
122. See generally, Panel Report, United States- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, WT/DS2 1I R
(Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter GATT Tuna Report]. This case is commonly referred to as Tuna I, and the
appeal of this case is referred to as Tuna II. Under the ruling of Tuna II, the United States must use
measures that are "reasonable available" in its attempt to ban products. Tuna 11 stood for the standard
that restrictions in trade policy must be "primarily aimed at" and "strictly necessary" for whatever
protection or intent at which the policy is aimed. The WTO stated that the U.S. could not impose trade
barriers to force other countries to comply with their environmental standards and policies. Peter V.
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traps.' 24 The Tuna-Dolphin case involved a U.S. attempt to adopt a restrictive trade
policy, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, which was aimed at protecting
dolphins by setting regulations on methods of tuna fishing. The GATT Panel did
not adopt the ruling, but did hold that the U.S. could not reach beyond its
jurisdiction to hold other countries to an American standard. 2 Similarly, in the
Shrimp-Turtle case, the WTO Appellate Body held that the U.S. law setting a
standard for shrimp trawling, aimed at protecting sea turtles, was discriminatory.'2 6
The WTO held that because the U.S. was requiring other WTO members in
different conditions to adhere to regulatory standards established by the U.S., this
regulation was a violation of WTO trade policy.'27
Commentators have expressed that because one of the stated aims of the KP is
to protect human life, the KP could fall under exception XX(b) of GATT.'28 In
accordance with the ruling of the Tuna-Dolphin case, the KP does not involve a
country overreaching its jurisdiction and forcing standards upon other countries.
The KP is a voluntary agreement involving numerous countries, rather than a result
of one country imposing a regulation on the others. The KP requirements were
created not by a single country or institution but rather by a conglomeration of
governments, diamond industry leaders, and NGO representatives. Thus, the
restrictions and standards instituted by the KP are not a result of one WTO country
reaching beyond its jurisdiction and imposing its standards upon another country.
Instead, any country willing to meet the requirements of the KP is eligible to
become a participant.
The KP could also be excepted from GATT under Article XXI, which provides
an exception based on national security reasons, due to a possible link between
conflict diamonds and terrorist groups.2 9 Likewise, Article XXI provides an
Michaud, Note, Caught in a Trap: The European Union Leghold Trap Debate, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 355,371 (1997).
123. See generally, Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 121.
124. See generally Michaud, Note, supra note 122 (detailing the debate surrounding animal
leghold traps and the WTO disputes between fur trappers and the European Union).
125. See GATT Tuna Report, supra note 122, 6-7.
126. See Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 121, 163, 184-88.
127. Id.
128. See Price, supra note 28, at 53-54. Price analyzes the KP in relation to the Shrimp-Turtle
case and makes the point that L- cause the KP is available for any country to sign, it is not an exclusive
regulation. Rather, the Kim'a, rlcy Process is multilateral, which will insulate it from any challenges
based on arbitrary or discriminatory application or standards. Id at 58. See also Michaud, supra note
122, at 367-374 (outlining the findings in Tuna I and Tuna II, including the standard for a XX(b)
exception).
129. GATT, supra note 13, art. XXI. Though not the focus of this comment, Article XXI of
GATT is relevant due to recent connections between conflict diamonds and terrorist groups. See COOK,
supra note 11, at 7 (providing details linking terrorist networks to conflict diamonds). Numerous
reports, one of which was in the Washington Post, have shown that terrorist groups have used diamonds
as a non-reported source of fungible assets. Douglas Farah, Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade,
WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 2, 2001, available at www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A27281-
2001Novl. Because of this link, one of many legislative intents in passing the Clean Diamond Trade
Act involved cutting off the illicit diamond trade in an effort to prevent terrorist groups intent on
harming the U.S. from obtaining funds via that avenue. See COOK, supra note 1I, at 25 (noting the
reasons why the recent U.S. legislation was introduced).
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exception for actions taken in accordance with the U.N. Charter.' Thus, because
the U.N. passed a resolution backing the implementation of the KP, this exception
could be applicable as well.' However, despite the possibility of a valid Article
XX(b) or Article XXI exception, the XX(a) exception, granting protection to trade
restrictions based upon public morals, is also a plausible safeguard for the KP
against any possible WTO challenge.
An example of a trade restriction that most likely would warrant a possible
XX(a) exception is the recent legislation surrounding importation of goods made
through the use of child labor.' The U.S. Congress passed the Trade and
Development Act of 2000, aimed at deterring child labor by preventing any
importation of goods made by indentured or forced child labor.'33 This trade
restriction could claim the XX(b) exception because child labor is considered a
hazard to human health."M However, it can also be argued that child labor is
considered contrary to public morality.' For instance, if a country could prove its
child labor was performed under completely safe circumstances and did not affect
the childrens' health, the country could attempt to challenge a XX(b) exception.
Consequently, the products of voluntary child labor would not be banned. An
exception to products produced by child labor, based on XX(a), however, would be
trickier to challenge because it would involve proving that the public morality had
shifted to the point that child labor was no longer considered contrary to public
morals. A morality exception is more encompassing, applying to the means of
production as well as the commodity being traded, and its standards are slightly
more nebulous than those necessary for proving a danger to public health.
B. The Morality Exception: Article XX(a)
Unlike other cases in which the XX(b) exception has been used, such as the
Tuna-Dolphin case3 6 or cases surrounding animal leg-traps,' in which the process
130. GATT, supra note 13, art. XXI(c).
131. G.A. Res. 56/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/263 (April 9,2002). See also Security Council Press
Release Supporting Kimberley Process, supra note 75 (announcing unanimous adoption of Security
Council Resolution 1459, which endorsed the Kimberley Process).
132. See Steve Chamovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 689, 740-42
(1998) (explaining why child labor could fall under a public morals exception). Charnovitz argues that
under child labor regulation, the "products of children working voluntarily would continue to be
permitted" and therefore, "a health defense under Article XX(b) would be awkward." Id at 740-41.
See also Glut, supra note 85, at 1208 (underlining the fact that child labor is contrary to American
values, noting that "child labor contributes to poverty rather than ameliorating it. By working, children
neglect their education, damage their health, and restrict their future earning capacity. Consequently,
children may grow up without the skills necessary for more advanced, higher-paying jobs.").
133. Matthew T. Mitro, Comment, Outlawing the Trade in Child Labor Products: Why the GATT
Article XXHealth Exception Authorizes Unilateral Sanctions, 51 AM. U. L. REv. 1223, 1227-28 (2002).
134. See id. at 1257.
135. See Chamovitz, supra note 132, at 740-41.
136. See generally GATT Tuna Report, supra note 122 (commonly referred to as Tuna I, and the
appeal of this case is referred to as Tuna II). These cases were not adopted by GATT but do illustrate
what is necessary to overcome an exception defense by way of a WTO challenge. These cases stand for
the idea that any regulation must be in accordance with the GATT, yet even a measure intended to
protect animal life or health under exception XX(b) cannot be "accomplished by unilateral action or by
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for obtaining the regulated goods was clearly endangering animal welfare, the
process for obtaining or mining diamonds does not necessarily endanger human
life.'38 Although numerous reports by NGOs have established a significant link
between conflict diamonds and human security, this link cannot be shown to
encompass all rough diamonds, which is the scope of the KP's regulation.'39 A
non-participant could bring a challenge stating that the trade of rough diamonds is
not inextricably tied to the protection of human life, as is necessary for a XX(b)
exception because less than one percent of rough diamonds are considered "conflict
diamonds," according to the World Diamond Council. 4 ' Thus, a non-participant
could argue that the XX(b) exception does not apply when the goods the policy
aims to restrict account for less than one percent of the traded commodity. This is
why an exception based on morality, XX(a), rather than on protection of human
health, XX(b), is a safer bet.
For instance, a valid distinction between the Trade and Development Act and
the Clean Diamond Trade Act is that a restriction on goods made from forced child
labor could be considered more closely related to the exceptions on restrictive
legislation than the conflict diamond legislation. Restrictions against forced child
labor regulate the direct product of what is considered contrary to either public
morals or public health. The means of production of the restricted goods is what is
at issue in the child labor legislation. In this sense, all goods produced by child
labor fall under the statute, and there is no risk that goods produced by other means
would fall under the umbrella of the Trade and Development Act.
The KP legislation, however, poses a more tenuous link between the actual
goods, rough diamonds, and the activity the regulation is intending to prohibit-- in
this case, the human rights violations of war and the illegal funding of war
criminals. In other words, the actual goods being regulated by the KP include
goods that do not necessarily coincide with the aims of the KP. All rough
diamonds are restricted, including rough diamonds that do not originate from rebel-
held territories but, for whatever reason, do not carry a certificate of origin with
them. In that sense, and unlike the child labor legislation, the KP exception based
means reaching beyond United States territory and into the jurisdiction of another." Mitro, supra note
133, at 1249.
137. See Chamovitz, supra note 132, at 736-37. These cases arose out of recent European
legislation banning any imports of goods derived from animals if the animals had been caught with
leghold traps. The legislation asserted that use of these traps was inhumane. Chamovitz, uses a two-
step analysis in which he analyzes whether the policy falls under the range of XX(a) and subsequently
determines if the policy is a necessity for the protection of public morals. He argues that because the
leghold trap is not an issue of animal health, the only exception for such a trade restriction would be
found under XX(a). See id. at 737-38.
138. The Shrimp-Turtle case and the Tuna-Dolphin cases invoked Article XX(b) in order to
protect animal life because the process involved in acquiring these goods was inherently dangerous to
animal life. The Kimberley Process, in contrast, is designed to regulate trade in diamonds and to curb
the potential evils of illegal diamond trading. The process of mining the diamonds themselves is not
necessarily "inherently dangerous" to human life, nor is it the aim of the Kimberley Process to regulate
the mining process.
139. See infra Section II.A.
140. World Diamond Council, Diamond Facts, http://diamondfacts.org/facts/index.html (last
visited Apr. 17, 2007).
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on XX(b) could be considered overbroad. However, because there has been such
strong international support for the KP, and clear indications that conflict diamonds
are related to human rights violations, it is unlikely the exception based on a
morality determination that challenges restrictive legislation made in compliance
with the KP will be challenged.
In regards to the possibility of a XX(a) exception for the KP, the essential
question hinges on whether trade in questionable rough diamonds is not in line with
"public morals." If this can be proven true, then an Article XX(a) exception would
stand.' 1 International treaties have long included morality exceptions. 4 1 Unlike
the history of litigation behind the XX(b) exception, however, no member state has
challenged a morally-based import ban.1
43
The morality exception is applicable for the KP because the KP aims to
regulate a type of good not because the goods are against public morals (as the case
may be for pornography, for example), nor that the means of production of those
goods are against public morals (i.e., child labor), but because the goods have been
significantly linked to the human rights violations, terrorist activity, and other evils
acts.'" Thanks to extensive campaigns by NGOs and the U.N. elucidating the link
between conflict diamonds and war crimes, as well as the publicity derived from
Hollywood blockbusters, the public awareness of the controversy surrounding the
diamond trade has grown. 4 As a result, a XX(a) exception, claiming the KP is in
line with public morals that are offended by the subsidization of criminals and their
violent acts, will be difficult to challenge.
CONCLUSION
Africa's wars have been prolonged by the ability of rebel groups to fund their
efforts by illegally trading diamonds for either cash or munitions. Due to reports
141. See GATT, supra note 13, art. XXI(a). Article XX(a) is designed to uphold national
sovereignty in the sense that national values are respected. This allows for "a contracting party to
pursue its own public policy goals; by the same token, Article XX cannot allow a contracting party to
dictate another contracting party's public policy goals." Feddersen, supra note 91, at 117. Since its
inception, GATT has undergone different rounds of negotiation, yet this exception was not elaborated
upon in the various editions of the treaty. Id. at 84 (outlining the history of GATT and its redactions,
including the most recent Uruguay Round negotiations which proffered modifications to numerous
articles of the treaty). Feddersen notes that every draft of Article XX has included exceptions based on
the protection of public morals, yet the actual meaning of the statement remains ambiguous. He
discusses whether the phrase "public morals" is equal to the legal concept of ordre public (public order),
"a conflict-of-laws rule relevant when jurisdictional problems occur between states." Id. at 118.
Likewise, Chamovitz notes the long history of including a moral exception in international law treaties,
and states that "[m]ost of these exceptions linked moral and humanitarian goals." Chamovitz, supra
note 132, at 710. These treaties regulating goods that also included moral exceptions dealt with
regulations on slave trade, opium, narcotics, and coca leaf. See id; see also Shira Pridan-Frank, Human-
Genomics: A Challenge to the Rules of the Game of International Law, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
619, 655 (2002) (stating that GATT Article XX(a) should be interpreted in such a way that it
incorporates human rights norms).
142. Chamovitz, supra note 132, at 710.
143. Seeid. at 731.
144. See supra Section I.A.
145. For one example, among many, the recent Leonardo DiCaprio movie, Blood Diamond,
detailed the horrors of wars and conflicts surrounding diamond mining in Africa.
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by vigilant NGOs, this international issue came to the attention of the diamond
industry and the governments of affected countries. As a result, the Kimberley
Process came into being. The Kimberley Process is a necessary evolution from
fairly ineffective U.N. sanctions and other attempts at regulating conflict diamonds
that are exported from Africa at the expense of thousands of African citizens who
must live with war.'" The Process involves blocking trade of rough diamonds that
do not accompany a certificate of origin to non-participants. This restrictive
measure is technically in violation of GATT."
Although a strong argument exists that the KP could warrant an exception to
WTO and GATT restrictions based on Article XX(b) or Article XXI, a compelling
argument may also be made that Article XX(a) grants an exception to the KP. The
amount of press and international attention given to the issue of conflict diamonds,
by NGOs, governments, and pop culture has, in essence, shaped our morality on
this issue. Because the KP was instituted in hopes of keeping the diamond trade
aligned with public morals, it should warrant a Article XX(a) exception should any
WTO challenge arise. Overall, the Kimberley Process represents a positive step
made by the international community, governments, and the diamond industry to
keep the diamond trade clean. One can hope that with further adjustments and
rectifications of the inherent flaws in the system, the KP will be effective in
keeping conflict diamonds out of the market and thereby restricting funding to
terrorist and rebel groups in Africa. With the safeguard of a WTO exception, the
Kimberley Process should continue to shape international law and trade and,
ideally, bring hope and stability to war-torn Africa.
146. See infra Section I.A.
147. Although the Kimberley Process will most likely be insulated from any WTO challenges on
the basis that it falls under the exception of Article XX(a), if not XX(b) or XXI, the Process will have
limited success, if any, until a monitoring body is installed. Without proper monitoring, even the
participants who have passed corresponding domestic legislation will be able to easily circumvent the
intention and ideals of the Process if this legislation is not policed. Therefore, the Kimberley Process
framers, and its participants, should establish an impartial, international monitoring group to ensure that
the certification system is followed.
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